ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirectTourismManagementjournalhomepage:www.elsevier.com/locate/tourmanAninvestigationofperceptionsofsocialequityandpriceacceptabilityjudgmentsforcampersintheU.S.nationalforestJoungkooParka,*,GaryD.Ellisb,1,SamuelSeongseopKimc,2,BrucePrideauxd,3aDepartmentofTourism&LeisureManagement,DonggukUniversity,Gyeongju,RepublicofKoreaDepartmentofRecreation,Parks&TourismSciences,TexasA&MUniversity,TX,USAcDepartmentofHospitality&TourismManagement,SejongUniversity,Seoul,RepublicofKoreadSchoolofBusiness,JamesCookUniversity,Queensland,AustraliabarticleinfoArticlehistory:Received31May2007Accepted28February2009Keywords:CampingNature-basedtourismPricingSocialequityPriceacceptabilityjudgmentConjointanalysisabstractInspiteofthesignificanceofsocialequityindeterminingappropriatefeelevelsforactivitiessuchascampinginpublicnature-tourismresources,therehasbeenlittleunderstandingofthemechanismsthat(a)influencethedebateoverscaleand(b)theconditionsthatareusedinfeedetermination.Themainobjectiveofthisstudyistoinvestigatethedecisionmakingprocessthatpredictssocialequityjudgmentsandpriceacceptabilityofuserfeesforactivitiessuchascampinginprotectedareas(includingparks)andoutcomethevariables.InthisstudyofWasatch-CacheNationalForestinnortheasternUtahusingconjointanalysistheresultsindicatedthattheextentofpublicinputwasthemostprominentpredictorofsocialequityjudgmentatp<0.01.Thesecondhighestpart-worthcoefficientwasobtainedinsupportoflowuserfees(ahypotheticalscaleof$3.00vs.$8.00).Themagnitudeofthepart-worthcoefficientsforpriceacceptabilityshowedthatthehighestpart-worthcoefficientwasafeelevelof$3.00.Thenexthighestpart-worthcoefficientwasinsupportofrevenuebeingusedtomaintainthequalityofthesite.Itwasalsofoundthatthat‘‘extensivepublicinput’’wasanimportantpredictorofsocialequity.Ó2009ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.1.IntroductionTheincreasinglyurbanisednatureofmodernsociety,inbothdevelopedanddevelopingnations,hasremovedurbanresidentsfromintimatecontactwithnatureandinpartcreatedademandfornature-basedtourism(Priskin,2001;Waitt,Lane,&Head,2003).Dependingonthedegreeofintimacythatparticipantswishtoexperiencewithnature,theymayselectfromaspectrumofopportunitiesthatrangefromcampingandhikingattheclose-to-natureendofthespectrumtobustourswithaccommodationintraditionalhotelsatthesoft-encountersendofthespectrum(Shafer&Choi,2006).Asglobalsocietyhasbecomeincreasinglyurbanisedtheinvestmentbygovernmentsintheestablishmentofprotectedareashasincreasedandby1996theworld’snetworkofprotectedareascomprised30,361parkscovering8.84%ofthetotallandareaoftheglobe(Eagles,2002).Alandinventoryofsuchmagnitudeiscostlytomaintainandinrecentyearsmanypark*Correspondingauthor.Tel.:þ82547702637.E-mailaddresses:jkpark85@dongguk.ac.kr(J.Park),gellis@ag.tamu.edu(G.D.Ellis),sskim@sejong.ac.kr(S.S.Kim),bruce.prideaux@jcu.edu.au(B.Prideaux).1Tel.:þ19798457324.2Tel.:þ82234083716.3Tel.:þ61740421039.0261-5177/$–seefrontmatterÓ2009ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.doi:10.1016/j.tourman.2009.02.012authoritieshaveimposedavarietyoffeesonvisitorsasamecha-nismtoincreaserevenueandinmanycasestooffsetparkmain-tenancecosts(Alpizar,2006;Sickle&Eagles,1998).InapaperthatexploredthetypeoftourismexperiencesthatmembersofgenerationsXandYwouldseekinthefuture,SingerandPrideaux(2006)identifiedcampingasanexperiencethatbothgenerationgroupsanticipatedparticipatingin.Thisisnotsurprisinggiventheoverallpopularityofnature-basedtourismofwhichcampingisanimportantcomponentofexperiencingnature(Murphy,1979;Stephens,Leonard,&Smolder,1989;Winter,2005).Comparedtothepastwhencampingwasenduredbecauseparticipantswereunabletoaffordmoreexpensiveformsofaccommodation,contemporarycampinghasemergedasaformoftourismexperiencethatalmostdemandsparticipantstoindulgeinthepurchaseofexpensiveaccessoriesfromlightweighttentstoself-inflatingairmattresses.Campingstoresoroutdoorsectionsinmajorretailestablishmentsstockextensiverangesofadvancedtechnologycampingaccessoriesforthehikerwhoisconcernedabouttheweightoftheequipmentcarriedaswellasforthemoresedentarycamperwhocanindulgeinitemssuchasportabletele-visionsets,furniture,shows,toiletsandsoon.InmanyUSandCanadianParkscampingisaprimaryformofin-parkaccommodationwithmoreexpensivebuiltfacilitiesJ.Parketal./TourismManagement31(2010)202–212203
locatedadjacenttheparkareas.Todate,muchofthedebateoncampingincludingpossibleenvironmentalimpactsandfeeschargedhasbeenundertakenintherecreationandenvironmentalliteratures.Asaconsequence,therehasbeenrelativelylittleexaminationoftheroleofcampingasatouristicactivity.Ifthenotionthatcampingisanactivityparticipatedinbytouristsisaccepted,thereisaneedformoreinformeddebateoncampinganditsroleasaformoftouristicactivity.Thispaperseekstostimulatedebateontheroleofcampingasaformoftouristicactivitybyexaminingissuesthatareassociatedwiththechargingoffeestocampersinprotectedareas.Thereisastrongeconomicargument,basedontheeconomicmodelsfavouredbythenewright(neoliberalism)schoolofthought(Giddens,1998),thatfeesshouldbechargedforentrancetoanduseofnationalparks,basedontheprincipleof‘userpays’(Laarman&Gregersen,1996).Thereisacounterargumentbasedonsocialdemocracyideals(Giddens,1998)thatasparksarepurchasedandmaintainedonbehalfofthecommunity,parksshouldbetreatedasafreegoodavailabletoallmembersofthecommunity,irrespectiveofincomeorplaceinsociety.Accordingtothisargumentandbasedonthestrongegalitarianismbeliefsofsocialdemocracy,allcitizensareregardedasstakeholdersandchargingoffeestoaccessacommunityassetheldintrustbythegovernmentonbehalfofallcitizensisdiscriminatory.Ifcitizenswholackfinancialresourcesaredeniedaccesstoaplacetheywouldnormallyexpectaccesstoaspartoftheirrightsofcitizenship,theegalitarianismprinciplesofsocialdemocracyarebreached.Moreover,thereisalsoanargumentthatparksareheldintrustforallcitizens,bothpresentandfuture,anditisthereforeinequitabletoexpectuserstoshoulderalltheburdenofupkeep.Fromtheperspectiveofparkmanagers,thedebateoverchargingfeeshasamorepracticalelement.Ifgovernmentsholdneoliberaleconomicviewsthatincludeabeliefinminimalgovernmentandmarketfundamentalism,theparkmanagersarelikelytofaceasituationofunder-fundingwheregovernmentsubsidiesareinadequatetomeettheexpensesofparkmanage-ment.Evenwhengovernmentshaveasocialdemocraticphilos-ophy,lackofgovernmentfundingmaybeaproblemparticularlywheresuchgovernmentsfaceincreasingcallsonrevenuefortheprovisionofparkservicesaswellasheath,educationandsecurity.Whereparkmanagersfaceasituationoffundingshortfalls,theimpositionoffeesisoftenseenasasolution.AccordingtoSickleandEagles(1998)mostoftheworld’sprotectedareaschargefeesalthoughthesefeesoftendonotmeetthecostofmanagingthepark.Iffeesarecharged,managersfacetheissueofsocialequity.Socialequity(Adams,1963,1965;Thibaut&Walker,1975)hasbeendefinedasatheorythatexplainshowindividualsevaluatethelevelofinvestmenttheymakeinanexchangesituationagainstthelevelofbenefitreceivedbytheirexchangepartnerandcanbedescribedinvariouswaysincludingconsistencyintheirtreatment,judg-mentsmadeaboutthelevelofoutcomesbeinginproportiontotheirinputsandaccordingtotheprincipleofreciprocity.Forexample,onequitygrounds,socialequitycanbeusedtojustifymanagerschargingdifferentialpricestousers.Thusmanagersmaydiscriminatebetweenlocalandnon-localresidentsbyestablishingadifferentialpricesystembasedonresidency.Otherformsofdifferentialpricingbasedonsocialequitygroundsincludeclassofuserorpurposeofuse.Forexample,inQueensland,Australia,visitorstotheGreatBarrierReefMarineParkarechargedaAUD$5entrancefeeiftheytraveltothereefonboardacommercialtourboatbutrecreationaluserstravellingintheirownboatdonotincurafee.InanotherexamplealsofromQueensland,visitorstotheWorldHeritageWetTropicsRainforstParkarechargedafeeiftheytravelintotheforestviaacommercialtourbutnotiftheytravelbytheirownvehicle.Whereparksarenottreatedasafreegood,theestablishmentofsocialequityandpriceacceptabilityforuserfeesisanimportantconcern.Failuretoachievefair,reasonable,andnondiscriminatoryfeescanleadtoavarietyofcomplaintsfromusersandresultindiminishedsupportforthemanagementagencyandevenhostileactionstowardtheresourceoritsstewards(McCarville,Reiling,&White,1996;Sheppard,Lewicki,&Minton,1992;Thomas&Louis,1977).Discriminatoryfeepoliciestowarddisenfranchisedstake-holders,wheredifferentclassesofusersarechargeddifferentfeesaccordingtoapredeterminedschedule,maygenerateconsiderablehostility,depreciativebehaviour,andsubsequentexpulsionfromparksandnaturaltourismareas.Insomecasesuserstendtoresisttheeffortsofserviceproviderswhoarebelievedtobeusingunfairpricingpractices(Kahneman,Knetsch,&Thaler,1976).Inhypo-theticalexercises,Kahnemanetal.(1976)foundthatsubjectsweretypicallywillingtoboycottunfairserviceprovidersevenwhentheboycottwasagainsttheirowninterests.Hostilityanddepreciativebehaviour(antisocialordeviatebehavioursuchaslittering,vandalismandotherdamagetothepark)arealsoofsignificantconcern.Visitorsmayrespondtoperceiveinjusticethroughfeelingsofdisapprovalandresentmentortheymayengageinactualretaliatoryorpunitivebehaviours(Adams,1965;Markovsky,1988).Beforeresortingtodirectretali-ation,userswhohavebeendisenfranchisedduetothenewfeestructuremayexpressanyofanumberofemotionalreactions,includinganger;rage;indignation;disappointmentandfeelingaggrieved;surprise;physicalsymptomsofarousalandstress;helplessnessanddepression;andenvy(Folger,1977;Shapiro,1991).Disenfranchisedusersmayalsorespondtoaperceivedunfairsituationthroughvandalismoranyofawiderangeofdepreciativebehaviourssuchassurfacemarking,vegetativedamage,maliciousbehaviours,littering,breakinglimbsofftrees,pollutingstreams,andcross-cuttingswitch-backs.Thesebehavioursrepresentanonymousrevengewherethemotivationisadesirebytheaggrievedvisitortoexpresstheirantagonismtowardparkmanagementagenciesandmanagers.Insuchcircumstances,alackofsocialequitymayincreasevisitors’desiretopunishandimposeharmfulconsequencesontheagencyofpersontheyperceivetobethewrongdoer(Greenberg&Folger,1990).Actionsofthisnatureareintendedtorestoresocialequityfromthestakeholders’viewpointwhentheyhavebecomedisen-franchisedasaresultofapolicychange(Sheppardetal.,1992).Theissueofuserfeestranscendstheinterestsofprominentstakeholdergroupssuchasregularvisitors.Whenmakingdeci-sionsaboutfees,managersshouldconsidersocialequityissuesincludingtouristsfromdifferentsocialclasseswhomayusetheresourceonabasisthatisdeterminedbytheamountofthefee(Martin,1999).Whenuserfeesaredeterminedtobeanacceptablemethodofsupplementingdeclininggovernmentreceipts,thesocialequityofthefeeis,inpart,afunctionofmanagerialeffortstoremoveunderprivilegedgroups’feelingsofrelativedeprivation.Thelevelofpriceappearstobeaffectedbyperceptionsofnondiscriminatoryfairness.Despitetheimportanceofsocialequityindeterminingappro-priatefeelevels,wehavelittleunderstandingofmechanismsthatinfluenceoutcomeinnaturalresourcefeecontexts.Equitytheorypresentsanopportunitytoaddressthisissue.Traditionalresearchonadmissionpricehasfocusedoneconomicdeterminantsofperceivingagivenprice(Crompton&Kim,2001;Crompton&Love,1994;Crompton&Lue,1992;Kim&Crompton,2002),andidenti-fyingconceptsuchasperceptionsoffairness,justiceorwillingnesstopay(Adams,1963;Ajzen&Driver,1992;Folger&Konovsky,1989;Greenberg,1986;McCarvilleetal.,1996;Markovsky,1988).However,thisstudyexaminesanintegrationofanumberofconceptsincludingusers’judgmentsofproceduraljusticeand204J.Parketal./TourismManagement31(2010)202–212
distributivejustice,perceptionoffairprice,socialequity,andpriceacceptabilityofuserfees.Previousstudieshavelargelyignoredtheconceptsofproceduraljusticeanddistributivejustice.Theunderpinningpurposeofthisstudyistoidentifydecisionmakingprocessesandoutcomevariablesthatmaybeusedtopredictsocialequityjudgmentsandpriceacceptabilityofuserfeesforcampersinprotectedareasincludingparks.2.LiteraturereviewSocialequitytheoryisasocialcomparisontheoryinwhichindividualsevaluatetheratiooftheinvestmentstheymakeinaparticularexchangewiththeprofitstheyderivefromit,relativetotheinvestmentsallocatedtotheirexchangepartners(Adams,1963;Crompton&Lamb,1986;Homans,1958;Lucy,1981;Walster,Walster,&Berscheid,1978).Socialequitytheoryofferstwoprom-inentperspectivesonmechanismsthatmayincreasetheproba-bilityofperceptionsofsocialequityamongvisitors:proceduraljusticeanddistributivejustice.Proceduraljusticecanbedefinedasthedegreeofinvolvementinthedecisionmakingprocess(Adams,1963,1965;Folger&Konovsky,1989).Proceduraljusticeaffectsformalcharacteristicsoftheprocedures,explanationoftheprocedures,andinterpersonaltreatmentofpersonsparticipatingindecisionmaking(Leventhal,1980;Tyler,1984).Procedurespromotingpersonalparticipationinadjudicationwereseenasfairest(Lissak&Sheppard,1983;Whit-worth,2003).Proceduraljusticeoccurswhenvisitorsincludinglocalsandtouristsidentifythemselvesasbeingcapableofprovidingavoicethatallowspeopleaffectedbythedecisiontohaveanopportunitytoexpresstheirviews.Accordingtoreviewundertakenofalargenumberofstudies(Arnstein,1969;Crompton,Lamb,&Schul,1981;McCay&Jentoft,1996),proceduraljusticecanbeachievedwithinthecontextoffiverules:consistency–proce-duresshouldbeappliedconsistentlyacrosspersonsandovertime;biassuppressionwheredecisionmakersshouldnotbeinfluencedbypersonalselfinterest;accuracywheredecisionsshouldbebasedongoodinformationandinformedopinion;correctabilitywhereopportunitiesshouldexisttoreversebaddecisions;andethicalitywhereproceduresshouldconformtopersonalethicalandmoralvalues.Theproceduraljusticeliteratureprovidesguidelinesforstruc-turingprocedurestomaximizesocialequityjudgments.Onemeansofachievingsocialequityjudgmentsisthroughvoiceorpublicparticipationwhereindividualsaffectedbythedecisionareabletopresentinformationrelevanttothedecision(Folger,1977).Evenwhenaparticulardecisionisunfavourabletoindividuals,iftheindividualsaffectedareabletoexpresstheirconcerns(voice)theywillfeelthattheirinterestsareprotectedinthelongrunandwillconsidertheprocessfair(Thibaut&Walker,1975).Havinginputintoadecisionalsomakespeoplefeelthatthedecisionmakersvaluetheirviewsandaffirmtheirstatusinthegroupororganiza-tionthattheyareamemberoforrepresent.Ontheotherhand,distributivejusticesuggeststhatindividualsaremotivatedtoallocaterewardsinaccordancewithrecipients’inputorworkcontributions(Cook&Hegtvedt,1983;Folger,1977;Mikula,Petri,&Tanzer,1990).Whileproceduraljusticefocusesonthemeans,distributivejusticefocusesontheendssuchasrewardinggroupmembersintermsoftheirrelativerankintheircontributiontogroupperformance.Accordingtosomestudies(Adams,1965;Walsteretal.,1978),socialequitytheoryhasfocusedonhowdistributionsoforganizationalrewards(outcomes)affectjobsatisfactionandperformance.Socialequityjudgmentinvolvesasocialcomparison,inwhichindividualsusesocialequityjudg-mentwhencomparingthesocialvalueandbenefitsoftheirinvestmentstheymakeinexchangefortheprofitstheyderivefromit,relativetotheirexchangepartners.Accordingtothestatusattributesofgain–lossexchange,basedonareferencegroup(Merton,1957),touristscomparethemselvestothosepossessingsimilarmonetaryresources(i.e.,similarincomes)asthereferencegroup.Thus,distributivejusticeoccursasaresultof;acceptabilityoftheburdenofcostsandbenefits;andcomparingoneselfwithotherswhoareusingthesamearea(Crompton&Lamb,1986).Distributivejusticetheoriesdifferintermsofwhatisseenastheprincipleofjustice.Thatis,socialequitytheoriesfocusonpro-portionalityofinputsandoutcomes(Adams,1965).Someequitytheoriesexpandthelistofcomparativejusticeprinciplestoembracecriteriathatincludeequalityofoutcomesacrossthegrouporthedistributionofoutcomesaccordingtoneed.Differenttheo-ristsofdistributivejusticeincludethosewhofocusonfeelingsofrelativedeprivation.Relativedeprivationtheorists(Crosby,1976;Folger&Martin,1986;Masters&Smith,1987)arguethatthesourceoffeelingsofinjusticeistherealizationthatone’soutcomesfallshortofexpectations.Theyareconcernedwithexpectation,whichisderivedbothfromimaginedoutcomesunderdifferentcircum-stancesandfromtheoutcomesofsalientothers.Thekeyquestionsconcernthegenerationofexpectationsandthecognitiveprocessbywhichpeopleexplainwhytheiractualoutcomesfallshortoftheirexpectations.Thus,theoriesofdistributiveequitysuggestthatpeopleevaluateauthoritiesbycomparingtheoutcomestheyreceivetotheoutcomesothersreceiveandusingthiscomparison,determinewhethertheoutcomedistributionisinaccordwithacceptedprinciplesoffairness.Socialfairnessmaydevelopthroughproportionalityofinputsandoutcomesasthesinequanonofjustice(Adams,1965;Walsteretal.,1978).Furthermore,somestudiesconcludethattheconceptsofsocialequityandpriceacceptabilityarelikelytoplaycriticalrolesindeterminingusers’responsetouserfees(Crompton&Kim,2001;Kim&Crompton,2002;McCarvilleetal.,1996).Asalreadynoted,attitudesaboutthelegitimacyofauthoritiesappeartobeakeyantecedentofcompliance.Whenfeesaredeemedfair,increasesinsocialequitymayresultinrepeatedpurchaseoftheleisureserviceandahigherlevelofwillingnesstopay(Ajzen&Driver,1992;Crompton,1984;Thaler,1985).Incontrast,ifuserfeesareconsideredunfair,visitorsofnaturalrecreationareasmaygenerateavarietyofundesirableoutcomessuchasdisplacement,vandalism,anger,resistancetousefeepayment,anddecreaseofwillingnesstovolunteer(Crompton&Kim,2001;McCarville,Driver,&Crompton,1992;McCarvilleetal.,1996).3.DevelopmentofhypothesesSocialequitytheoryprovidesatheoreticalframeworkforexaminingtheresearchhypothesesofthisstudy.Accordingtothattheory,proceduraljusticeanddistributivejusticemaybesignifi-cantvariables.Withrespecttotheinvolvementroleofstakeholder,thereareanumberofactorsinvolvedoraffectedwhocanbeidentifiedasstakeholders.Onthedemandsidetheseincludeusers,citizensasvotersandtaxpayerandmembersofinterestgroups.Onthesupplysidetheseincludepublicagencies.Throughpublicinvolvement,stakeholderscanshareinformationaboutproposedmanagementactionsprovidedthatthereareeffectivecommuni-cationchannels(Barrett-Howard&Tyler,1986).Ideallycitizensshouldhavetherighttoexpresstheirviewsonpolicyformulation.Priceacceptabilityofuserfeesalsoisaffectedbyparticipationactivity.Intherelationshipbetweenusergroupsandpublicagencies,thefeedecisionisanegotiateddecisionthatfosters‘‘commonplace’’(Folger,1977;Tyler&Lind,1992).Thus,partnershipsbetweenpubliclandagenciesandstakeholdersareanimportantpredictorofJ.Parketal./TourismManagement31(2010)202–212205
socialequityandfeeacceptability.Thisstudyassumesthathighersocialequityjudgmentsandpriceacceptabilityofuserfeestendtooccurwhenvisitorsjudgethatafeelevelhasbeenestablishedbasedonextensivepublicinput(Becker,1992;Gibson,1991).Publicmeetingsareusedforfacilitatingpublicparticipation.Stakeholders’inputislikelytoincreaseopportunitiesforhighersocialequityandpriceacceptabilityofuserfeesinparticipatorymechanisms(Lauber&Knuth,1999).The‘‘frequentusersfavoured’’variableisonefactorthatisaselectedproceduralvariable.Nostudieshavebeendesignedspecificallytotestforthepresenceofthistypeofperceivedinequality(i.e.,didtheproceduresfavoursomeoverothers?)amongusertypes.Equalopportunityisthoughttobeanimportantconcernindecisionmaking(Mithaug,1996).Itisoftenargued,however,thatfrequentusersshouldhavegreatervoiceinmakingdecisions(Arai,1996;Wernstedt,2000)becausedecisionsmadewillhavethegreatestimpactonstakeholderswhomostfrequentlyusetheresource.Inpreviousstudies,frequentusersneartheforestsareespeciallysensitivetoactionstolevyuserfeesthatmayincreasetheireconomicburden(Soden,1995).Thisstudyassumedthatfromthisperspective,somedecisionsaboutthelevelofuserfeelevelsmaybebiasedtowardthedesiresandopinionsexpressedbyfrequentusers.Socialequitytheory,however,arguesthatapricesubsidyforlowincomeusersisessentialtomaintaintheirsocialequalopportunity(Kahnemanetal.,1976;McCarville,Crompton,&Sell,1993).Piaget(1965)arguesbeliefsaboutjusticefromthecognitivedevelopmentalapproach.Piaget’s(1965)analysisofmoraldevel-opmenthasbeenelaboratedonbyKohlberg(1963)intoathree-levelmodelofmoraljudgments.Atlevelone(preconventionalmorality),anactisjudgedonthebasisofitsphysicalconsequencesratherthanonthebasisofintentionoffairness.Atleveltwo(conventionalmorality),actsarejudgedintermsoftheirconfor-mitytosocialorderandthewishesofrespectedauthorities.Thebeliefinajustworldmaybebasedonadutyorientedtendencytoupholdsocialinstitutions.Atlevelthreepeoplebegintomakemoraljudgmentsonthebasisofuniversalprinciplesoffairnessandhumanrights.Peoplemaybemorewillingtochallengetheactionsoflegiti-mateauthoritieswhentheyconflictwithhigherstandardsofjustice(Christensen&Dustin,1989).Accordingtothe‘‘theoryofgenerosity’’(Monroe,1973),individualswillbewillingtopayhigherfeesifexcessprofitsareallocatedtodeservingcharities(Kahnemanetal.,1976).Monroe(1973)emphasizedthat‘‘gener-osity’’isreflectedinwillingnesstopayjudgmentsthatreflectsacrificesforotherswhohavealowincomestatus.Peoplealsoexpresscharitytowardwelfarerecipients,regardlessoftheratio(gain–oss)exchange,basedon‘‘prosocialbehaviourtheory’’(Gra-mann&VanderStoep,1987).Thisstudyassumesalargerpart-worthcoefficientfor‘‘freeusebylowincomepeople’’than‘‘everyonepaysthesamefees.’’Forexample,‘‘freeusebylowincomepeople’’maybeacceptabletosociallyweakercitizenswhohavealowersocialstatusbutdonothaveperceptionsofinequity(Arrow,1973).Priceisofsufficientuniversalimportancetobetheprimarydeterminantofsocialequityandpriceacceptabilityofuserfees.Lowincomepopulationswouldpreferafairlyproportionaldistributionofsocialburdens,whilethosewholivenearbypreferenhancedqualityanddecisionauthority.Theyarepricesensitive,butdoseekqualityservice(Bies&Moag,1986;Homans,1958).Higheronsitefeesweresignificantlycorrelatedwithperceivedfinancialconstraintsforlowincomeusers.Researchonpriceperceptionshasfoundseveralperceivedconcernsaboutthepsychologicalaspectsofprice,buildingupconceptualandempiricalsupportfortheeffectofvariouspricelevelsondeterminantsofpriceacceptabilityandpricefairness(Kamen&Toman,1971).The‘‘underclasshypothesis’’(Lineberry,1977;Mladenka&Hill,1977)emphasizesthatsocioeconomicallydisadvantagedgroupsmaybemoresensitivetopricelevels.Thereisapossibilitythatmembersofthelowereconomicbracketsmaybepricedoutofthemarketasaresultofhigheruserfees.Thisstudyassumesthathigherfeeschargedforprovidingoutdoorrecreationfacilitiesmayexcludedisadvantagedgroupsintermsofaccesstonaturalresource-basedrecreation.Willingnesstopay(WTP)studies(McDonald,Hammitt,&Dottavio,1985;Noe,McDonald,&Hammitt,1986)alsosuggestthatlowpricestendtoproducebetteracceptancerates.TheactualrespondentsinWTPstudiesassumedthatthepart-worthcoefficientassociatedwithlowpriceishigherthanthatofhighfeesonsocialequityandpriceacceptabilityofuserfees.Someusersmaycomplainbitterly,arguingthatpublicagenciesshoulddemonstrategratitudefortheirfrequentpatronagebychargingthemalowerpricethanotherusers.Othersaguethatfrequentcustomersshouldberewardedfortheirloyalty.Whiletherehasbeensubstantialresearchintothevariousformsofpricepromotionusedtorewardfrequentusers(i.e.,programsawardingpercentagediscountsforfrequentusers’patronage),pricepromotionofusersfeesremainslargelyunexamined.Littleresearchexiststhatincorporatesa‘‘frequentuserbenefits’’variableintosocialequityandfeeacceptability.Membershipsorseasonticketswhichprovidebenefitstofrequentusersareonestrategythatmaybeappro-priateforusersofnationalparksandforests.Tohelpfillthisgapintheliteraturethisstudyassumesalargerpart-worthcoefficientfor‘‘frequentuserbenefits’’vs.‘‘nofrequentuserbenefits’’onsocialequityandfeeacceptability.Afundamentalassumptioninthevariousequitytheories(Adams,1963)isthatindividualsfeelmostcomfortablewhentheyreceiveafairreturnfortheirsocialinvestments.McCarvilleetal.(1993)suggestthatpersonaladvantagesaccruingfrompaymentmayleadvisitorstobewillingtopaymoreandtoconsideruserfeestobemoresociallyequitable.Userstendtowantthemoneycollectedfromthemtobeusedtoimproveinformationalsigns,toprotectresources,toimprovewildlifehabitat,toimprovetrail-heads,andtoincreasevisitorsafety.Whenconsideringhowtheirfeeshavebeenused,visitorswillassessthebenefitstheyhavereceivedonascalerangingfromnobenefitstoconsiderablebenefits(Fedler&Miles,1989).Thehighestacceptabilityratingsoccurwhereitisdemonstratedthatfeerevenueremainsinthearea.Outcomefavourabilitycanbeconcludedtooccurinsituationswherevisitorstopublicparkhavepaidfeesthathavebeenretainedintheareaforinvestmentinnewfacilitiesand/ormaintenance.Thisstudyassumesthatalargerpart-worthcoefficientwillbefoundfor‘‘staysatsitetomaintainqualityservice’’incomparisonwith‘‘goestoU.S.Treasurytobenefitthecountryasawhole’’inthe‘‘howisrevenuedistributed’’variable.Thisstudyexaminestheeffectsofproceduraljusticeanddistributivejusticeontwocriterionvariablesinpredictingacceptabilityofuserfeesandsocialequityinnaturalresourcefeecontexts.Thepurposeofthisstudy,therefore,wastoidentifydecisionmakingprocessandoutcomevariablesthatpredictsocialequityjudgmentsandpriceacceptabilityofuserfeesatanationalforest.Thefollowinghypothesesweretestedinthisstudy.Hypothesis1.Regressioncoefficientsfortheextentofpublicinput,theextenttowhichfrequentusersarefavouredindecisionprocess,pricesubsidy,feelevels,frequentuserbenefits,andhowisrevenuedistributedinpredictionsofsocialequityjudgmentsarenonzero.Hypothesis2.Regressioncoefficientsfortheextentofpublicinput,extenttowhichfrequentusersarefavouredindecisionprocess,pricesubsidy,feelevels,frequentuserbenefits,andhowisrevenuedistributedinpredictingpriceacceptabilityofuserfeesarenonzero.206J.Parketal./TourismManagement31(2010)202–212
4.Methods4.1.MeasurementThisstudyusedaratings-basedconjointanalysismethod.Inthefirststage,asystemforthemeasurementofvariableswasdevel-opedandasetofhypotheticalscenariosconstructed.Thiswasfollowedbytheselectionofcombinationswhichwereusedforconjointanalysisfromallpossiblecombinationsofscenarios.Next,12feescenariosweredevelopedtoallowrespondentstoratethemforsocialequityandfeelevelacceptability.Variablesthatdefinedthescenarioswerederivedfromproce-duralanddistributivejusticetheory.Eachscenariocontaineddifferentcombinationsoflevelsofthesixvariables.Thespecificvariablesandthelevelsusedin12feescenariosarepresentedinTable1.Thetwodependentvariablesthatweremeasuredinthisstudyareperceivedsocialequityandthepriceacceptabilityofuserfees.Inthisstudy,socialequityisdefinedasrecreationists’perceptionsofwhatisrightorjustinaparticularsetting(Kyle,Graefe,&Absher,2002).Socialequitywasmeasuredwithasingleitemresponsetoeachofthe12scenariosthatwerepresentedtoparticipants.Thequestionthataskedaboutsocialequitywas‘‘howfairdoyoubelievethispolicywouldbeforallcitizens?’’Respondentsincludebothpotentialusersaswellasfrequentusersbecausecampingisarecreationresourcethatisequallyallocatedtoalltaxpayersinthecommunityataverylowprice.Responseoptionsrangedfrom‘‘completelyunfair’’(scored0)to‘‘completelyfair’’(scored10).Thewordingofthisitemissimilartowordingusedinpreviousresearch(Crompton,1984;Crompton&Love,1994;Kah-nemanetal.,1976;Kyleetal.,2002).ThemeasurementofpriceacceptabilityofuserfeeswasbasedonmethodologypreviouslyusedinstudiesbyCromptonandKim(2001),KimandCrompton(2002).Asingleitemmeasurewasoperationalizedas‘‘towhatextentdoyouconsiderthepricetobeTable1Questionsandcardattributelevelstomeasuresindependentvariables.VariablesorattributesDescriptionPublicinputItreferstotheextenttowhichinterestedcitizensexpresstheiropinionsfrommeetingsinwhichparticipantsweredividedintosmallgroupsfordiscussion.Onscenarios,‘‘extensivepublicinputthroughmeetings&writteninputusedinchoosingtheprice’’(level1)or‘‘nosincereopportunityforpublicinput’’(level2).Frequentusersfavouredin‘‘yes!specialmeetingforfrequentusers’’(level1)decisionprocessassumethatspecialpublicmeetingsheldforfrequentusers’’or‘‘nospecialmeetingsoropportunitiesforinputbyfrequentusers’’(level2).PricesubsidyItassumesthatpeoplewithlowincomesandpeoplewhoareretiredarenotrequiredtopaythefee.Thefeeisestablishedontwooptions:‘‘yes!freeusebylowincomepeople’’(level1)and‘‘no,everyonepaysthesamefees’’(level2)FeelevelsThelevelsofpriceineachscenariowillbeeither‘‘$3.00pervehicleperday’’(level1)or‘‘$8.00pervehicleperday’’(level2).ForcampersthesefeesareinadditiontocampingfeesthattheyarerequiredtopayFrequentuserbenefitsFeeratesforafrequentuserareestablishedontwooptions:‘‘SeasonPassat$20.00’’(level1)and‘‘Nofrequentuserbenefits’’(level2)HowisRevenueDistributedEachscenariowillindicatehowthefeemoneyisused.When‘‘staysatsitetomaintainqualityservice’’(level1)islisted,assumethatthefeemoneyisusedtoimproveandmaintaintheSmithandMorehousearea.When‘‘goestoUSTreasurytobenefitthecountryasawhole’’(level2)appearsonascenario,assumethatthefeemoneygoestotheUnitedStatesGovernment,forwhateverusegovernmentleadersmaychoose.acceptable?’’Responsesforthisitemweremeasuredonarangefrom‘‘completelyunacceptable’’(scored0)to‘‘completelyaccept-able’’(scored10).Independentvariablesusedinthisstudywereidentifiedthroughaliteraturereview,inputfromprofessorsattheDepart-mentofParks,Recreation,andTourism,UniversityofUtah,andthroughapretest.Inthepretest,33studentsfromoutdoorrecre-ationclassesattheUniversityofUtahwereaskedtorespondtoopen-endquestions,suchas‘‘whatfactorsdoyouconsiderimportantwhendecidingwhethertoevaluateauserfeepolicyoftheUSDAForestService?’’and‘‘howimportantarethesefactors?’’Throughthispretestprocess,somesentenceswererewordedorrevised.Detailedinformationonthemeasurementofindependentvari-ablesispresentedinTable1.Thetwelvescenariosincludedasetofconditionsthatvariedaccordingtotwodimensionsofproceduraljusticeandfourdimensionsofdistributivejustice.Theproceduraljusticevariablesthatweretestedincludedinvolvementofstakeholdersinthedecisionprocess(opportunityprovidedvs.noopportunityprovided),andtheextenttowhichparticularstakeholderswerefavouredoverotherstakeholdersinmakingthedecisionaboutthefeelevel(localresidentsandfrequentusersfavouredvs.nostakeholdersfavoured).Thefourdimensionsofdistributivejusticetestedwerepricesubsidy,feelevel,frequentuserbenefits,andhowrevenueisdistributed.Twofeelevelsforcampersweretestedineachscenario.Thefirstlevelwas$3.00pervehicleperdayandthesecondlevelwas$8.00pervehicleperday.The$3.00pervehicleperdayfeewasselectedasitwasthecurrentfeelevelchargedforentrytotheMirrorLakeScenicByway,acampingarealocatedincloseproximitytothesurveyedarea.The$8.00pervehicleperdayfeewasselectedbecauseitistherevisedfeelevelthatisproposedfortheregioninthefuture.Respondentswereaskedtheextenttowhichsomestakeholdergroupsaresubsidizedbyhigherfeespaidbyotherstakeholdergroups(subsidyvs.nosubsidy),presencevs.absenceofafrequentuserbenefit(aseasonpassat$20.00),andhowfeerevenueisused(tomaintainorimprovethesitevs.tobedepositedintheU.S.Treasury).Eachscenariowassummarizedonaseparatepageofthesurveyandwaspresentedtoeachparticipantinarandomlyselectedorder.Acito(1977)commentedthatthemeasuredimportanceofavari-ableistosomeextentaffectedbytheorderorpositionofthevariableonthestimuluscard.Toreducethispotentialbias,theorderoftheattributeswasrandomized.Scenarioswereprintedinalargefontandwerepresentedonlaminatedcards.Theywereorganizedintoaringbindertofacilitatereorderingfordifferentinterviews.Thispartofthestudywaspilottestedwith20graduatestudentsintheDepartmentofParks,Recreation,andTourismattheUniversityofUtahtoensurethateachfactorwaseasilyunderstoodandappropriatelyoperationalized.Thedesignofthescenariosusedinthisstudywasanorthogonalarraysampledfromthecompletefactorial,suchthattheadditivemain-effectscouldbeestimated.Inthisstudytwelveoutof64possiblefractionalfactorialdesigncombinationswereselectedfortestingtoavoidalengthyquestionnaire.The12hypotheticalscenarioswereautomaticallychosenbyorthogonaldesignoptionofSPSSprogram.4.2.StudysiteanddatacollectionDatawerecollectedattheSmithandMorehouseareaoftheWasatch-CacheNationalForest(KamasRangerDistrict)innorth-easternUtah.Theelevationofthecampgroundis7800feetandthesiteincludestwodevelopedcampgrounds,asmallreservoir,andtrailheadsleadingtotheinteriorofthenationalforest.TheSmithandMorehouseareaiswellknowntocampingtouristsbecauseitsJ.Parketal./TourismManagement31(2010)202–212207
featuresincludefishing,picnicking,boating,viewingscenicbeauty,andcampingduringsummermonths.ThecampgroundsareopenfromlateMaytoearlySeptembereachyear.Datawascollectedfrom228campingtouristsatcampgroundsintheSmithandMorehouseregionoftheWasatch-CacheNationalForestduringthesummerof2003.Researchersrandomlyselectedsamplingdaysonwhichtoconductinterviewswithcampers.TheSmithandMorehouseareaissituatedincloseproximitytotheMirrorLakeScenicByway,whereaRecreationFeeDemonstrationProgram(RFDP)thatwasinitiatedin1997.Thisarrangementincreasedthelikelihoodofincludingrespondentswhohavebeenexposedtouserfeesinnationalforests.Othervisitors’groupssuchasday-tripperswereruledoutbecausetheywerenotrequiredtopayuserfeesforentrytothecampground.Asamplesizeofbetween200and300isgenerallyconsideredtobeofsufficientsizetoyieldreliablecoefficientsthroughconjointanalysisalgorithms(Green&Srinivasan,1978).Thesampleframewascomprisedofcampersatthetwocampgrounds.Randomselectionwasaccomplishedbyassigninginterviewstorandomlyselectedtimeblocks(Ruddell,1992).Interviewswereconductedwithin3-htimeblocks(9:00amtonoon,noonto3:00pm,or3:00pmto6:00pm)duringbothweekdayandweekenddaysbetweenMay15andSeptember30,2003.Thenumberofinter-viewsperdaywasapportionedbyweekendvs.weekdayestimatesofhistoricalvisitationpatterns.Interviewswereconductedbyonegraduatestudentandtenundergraduatestudentswhoweretrainedtogreetcampingtourists,introducethemselves,andbrieflyexplainthepurposeofthesurveyandthenaskcampersiftheyarewillingtoparticipate.Theinterviewersweredirectedtoonlyapproachpersonsagedover18whowerestayingatthatcampsite.4.3.DataanalysismethodsConjointanalysis,whichwasusedtoanalysethedatacollectedinthesurveys,isamethodthatcanbeusedtoexaminearangeofproductorserviceattributesandallowsjudgmentsabouteachtodeterminetheirfinalpurchasechoice(Green&Rao,1971;Johnson,1974).Thebasicanalyticalobjectiveofconjointanalysisistofindasetofpart-worthvaluesforeachofaseriesofproductorserviceattributesthatareincludedinaninvestigation.Forexample,inastudyofautomobilepurchasedecisions,part-worthvaluesmightbegeneratedforeachofthreeattributesforafinancialincentivevariable:rebatevs.lowinterestrate,loanvs.nohagglepricing.Thepart-worthvaluesoftheattributesofeachvariablecanthenbeusedtocalculateatotalutilityscoreforthevariablesusedinthestudy.Table2presentsthestepsinvolvedintheconjointanalysisundertakeninthisresearch.Inthisstudy,part-worthcoefficientswerecalculatedforperlevelofeachattribute,whereasaverageimportancevalueswerecalculatedforeachvariable.Asetofdummycodedvectorswascreatedtorepresentsixproceduraljusticeanddistributivejusticevariables.Additionally,criterion-scalingthroughasinglevectorwhichmaybeusedtorepresentindividualdifferences(Pedhazur,1982),wasusedtorepresentindividualdifferences(within-subjectseffects).Thismethodisbasedoncalculatingthemeanscoreofthedependentvariableforeachparticipantandthenpairingthosemeanswiththeirrespectivedependentvariableobservationsforeachcaseinthedataset.Theresultingparameterestimates(e.g.,R2,b)areequivalenttothosethatcouldbeobtainedthroughthetraditionmethodofusingk-1codedvectors,butdegreesoffreedommustbeadjustedtoappropriatelycalculateandinterpretthecorrespondingteststatistics(e.g.,F-value,t-value).Finally,thehypothesesweretestedusingseparateregressionequationsforsocialequityandpriceacceptabilityofuserfees.Table2Stepsinvolvedinconjointanalysis.StepAlternativeExamplesmethods1.SelectionofamodelVector-Greaterdurability,smallerwaitingofreferencemodeltimeIdeal-point-Moderatelevelsofsweetnessormodelsizeofautomobileatideal-pointPart-worth-Maximumtemperaturelevelsforfunctionbothiced&hotteaandhavemodelalowerpreferenceforin-betweentemperaturelevels2.DatacollectionTwo-factor--2factors(e.g.,treadlifesuchas30,methodat-a-time000miles,40,000miles,and50,000milesXtirebrand,suchasGoodyear,Goodrich,andFull-profileFirestone)-Manystimuli(e.g.,Brand,Treadlife,sidewall,price,andetc.)3.StimulussetFractional-Fiveattributes,inwhichnointer-constructionfactorialactionscanbeseparatelyesti-designmated,andmain-effectsplanwithonlyreducedstimuliRandom-Randomsamplingfrommultivar-samplingiatedistribution4.StimulusVerbal-EachcarddefiningthelevelsofpresentationdescriptioneachoftheattributesParagraph-AmorerealisticandcompletedescriptiondescriptionofthestimulusPictorial-Visualprops,sketches,andpresentationpictures5.MeasurementscalePaired-AsetofpairedevaluationstoselectforthedependentcomparisonsstimuluspairsvariableRankorder-FirstsortingthecardsfrommostRatingpreferredtoleastpreferredscales-Ratecardsonascaleofapproxi-matelyintervalscaleproperties6.EstimationmethodMONANOVA-OrdinallyscaleddependentvariableOLSregression-IntervallyscaleddependentvariableLOGIT-Pairedcomparisontoachoiceprobabilitymodel5.ResultsRespondentsofthisstudywerelargelymiddle-aged,almostequalingender,well-educated,mostlyEuropeanAmerican,andmostlyUtahresidents.TheyhadanaverageannualpersonalincomeofUS$34,767,visitedthecampingareaonaverageof2.1timesperyearandweremembersofgroupsofcampersthathadanaveragesizeof3.1persons.5.1.RankingoftwelvescenariosThemeans,standarddeviations,andrankingforeachofthe12scenariosonoutcomevariablesarepresentedinTable3.Thegrandmeanvalueacrossall12scenariosforsocialequitymeasurementwas5.53.Thescenariothatproducedthehighestmeanscoreonsocialequitywasscenario1whichischaracterizedbylevelsofallvariablesthatwouldbeindicativeofhighlevelsofproceduralanddistributivejustice.Conversely,respondentstothisstudyscoredlowestonsocialequityinscenario2thatinvolvesasubsidyforlowincomeusersbytheU.S.government.Inaddition,descriptivestatisticssuggestthatpublicinputmaybeanimportantfactorindeterminingthepriceacceptabilityofuserfees.Thegrandmeanacrossthe12scenariosforpriceacceptabilityofuserfeeswas5.73.Respondentsalsoratedscenario1asthescenariowiththehighestpriceacceptability,whereasscenario5producedthelowestmeanscoreonthepriceaccept-abilityconcept.Forpriceacceptabilityofuserfees,salientpredic-torswere‘‘feelevels,’’‘‘distributionoffee,’’and‘‘benefitsto208J.Parketal./TourismManagement31(2010)202–212
Table3Descriptiveresultsandranksofeachscenarioonsocialequityandpriceacceptability.ScenarioAttributesofscenariosPI123456789101112YNNYYNNYNYYYFFYNYNYNNNYYYYPSYYNNYNYNNNNYFee$3$3$3$3$8$8$8$8$3$3$8$8FBYNNNYYYNNYNYFDABBABAABABABSocialequityMean7.174.125.106.055.044.655.185.126.086.165.705.93SD2.392.572.392.462.502.592.522.602.302.622.562.60Rank112941011783265PriceacceptabilityMean7.325.635.906.614.565.145.464.866.726.285.195.27SD2.552.942.682.532.632.722.692.692.482.692.702.54Rank175312106112498Note:PI:Publicinput(Y¼publicinput;N¼nopublicinput),FF:Frequentusersfavouredindecisionprocess(Y¼Yes,N¼No),PS:Pricesubsidy(Y¼Freeuserbylowincomepeople;N¼Everyonepaysthesamefees),Fee:Feelevels,FB:Frequentuserbenefits(Y¼passat$20;N¼nobenefits),FD:Howrevenueisdistributed(A¼stayatsite;B¼U.S.Treasury).frequentusers.’’TheSpearmanrankcorrelationwasusedtochecktheexistenceofamonotonicrelationshipbetweenthe12scenariosonsocialequityandfeeacceptabilityusingahypotheticalfeeonthetwooutcomevariables.Theresultsproducedindicatedthatbothsocialequityandpriceacceptabilityofuserfeestendtoberankedbyrespondentsinsimilarways.5.2.ResultsofconjointanalysisResultsoftheconjointanalysisproducedpart-worthcoeffi-cientsandaveragedimportancevaluesthatindicatetherelativeimportanceofthevariablesindeterminingsocialequityandpriceacceptabilityjudgments.ResultsoftheconjointanalysisandtheregressionanalysisaresummarizedinTables4and5.Forsocialequityjudgments,themostprominentpart-worthcoefficientwas‘‘extensivepublicinput’’(.482,t¼10.968,p<.01).Thenexthighestpart-worthcoefficientwasinsupportofthe‘‘$3.00feelevel’’(.408,Table4Part-worthcoefficients,importance,rank,t-value,andp-valuesforsocialequity.DimensionsandattributesPublicinputExtensivepublicinputNosincereopportunityFrequentusersfavouredindecisionprocessSpecialpublicmeetingsheldforfrequentusersNospecialmeetingsbyfrequentusersPricesubsidyFreeuserbylowincomepeopleEveryonepaysthesamefeesFeelevels$3.00pervehicleperday$8.00pervehicleperdayFrequentuserbenefitsSeasonpassat$20.00NofrequentuserbenefitsHowisrevenuedistributedStaysatsitetomaintainqualityserviceGoestoU.S.TreasuryNote:*p<.01.Part-worthcoefficients.482À.48219.6.362À.3621.2.022À.02222.1.408À.40811.3.208À.20819.7.364À.36438.50.0054.08.0029.26.006.45.6548.15.00Importance26.1Rank1t-Value10.97p-Values.00t¼9.256,p<.01),followedby‘‘staysatsitetomaintainquality’’(.364,t¼8.504,p<.01),‘‘specialmeetingforfrequentusers’’(.362,t¼8.147,p<.01),‘‘seasonpassat$20.00’’(.208,t¼4.079,p<.01),and‘‘pricesubsidyforthelowincomeusers’’(.022,t¼.445,p¼.656).Withtheexceptionofthecoefficientassociatedwith‘‘pricesubsidyforthelowincomeusers’’(t¼.445,p¼.656),allcoefficientsweresignificantatthe.01level.Resultsoftheconjointanalysisproducedaveragedimportancevaluesforeachfactor.Thesevalueswerecomputedbytakingthepart-worthcoefficientrangefortheparticularfactoranddividingitbythesumofallthepart-worthcoefficientranges.Thecalculationresultsinascorethatrangesfrom0%to100%andthesumoftheaveragedimportanceweights(%)isequalto100.Inthisstudy,theaveragedimportanceofeachvariableforsocialequityandpriceacceptabilityofuserfeesisreportedinTables3and4.Forsocialequity,thelargestaveragedimportancewasassociatedwith‘‘extentofpublicinput’’(26.1%).ThenexthighestaveragedTable5Part-worthcoefficients,importance,rank,t-value,andp-valuesforpriceacceptability.DimensionsandattributesPublicinputExtensivepublicinputNosincereopportunityFrequentusersfavouredindecisionprocessSpecialpublicmeetingsheldforfrequentusersNospecialmeetingsbyfrequentusersPricesubsidyFreeuserbylowincomepeopleEveryonepaysthesamefeesFeelevels$3.00pervehicleperday$8.00pervehicleperdayFrequentuserbenefitsSeasonpassat$20.00NofrequentuserbenefitsHowisrevenuedistributedStaysatsitetomaintainqualityserviceGoestoU.S.TreasuryNote:*p<.01.Part-worthcoefficients.147À.14712.3.201À.2011.4.022À.02244.2.716À.7169.9.161À.16123.0.373À.37328.37.0043.04.00115.06.006.42.6734.34.00Importance9.1Rank5t-Value3.24p-Values.00J.Parketal./TourismManagement31(2010)202–212
Table6Resultsofmultipleregressionanalysestopredictsocialequityandpriceacceptability.209
IndependentvariablesSocialequityCoefficientt-ValueX1:Publicinput.9610.97X2:Frequentusersfavoured.738.15X3:Pricesubsidy.05.45X4:Feelevels.829.26X5:Frequentuserbenefits.424.08X6:Howisrevenuedistributed.738.50Constant3.48R2.70Note:p<.01.importancewasfoundon‘‘feelevels’’(22.1%).Averagedimportancelevelsof‘‘howisrevenuedistributed’’(19.7%)and‘‘frequentusersfavouredinthedecisionprocess’’(19.6%)weresimilartotheaveragedimportancevalueforuserfeelevels.Ontheotherhand,averagedimportancelevelsfor‘‘frequentuserbenefits’’and‘‘pricesubsidy’’were11.3%and1.2%,respectively.Themagnitudeofthepart-worthcoefficientsforpriceaccept-abilityshowedasimilarpattern.Othercoefficients,withtheexceptionof‘‘pricesubsidy’’(.022,t¼.422,p¼.673),weresignifi-cantatthe.01level.Theregressioncoefficientassociatedwith‘‘pricesubsidy’’wasnotsignificantlydifferentfromzeroineitherofthetworegressionmodels.Thehighestpart-worthcoefficientwas.716(t¼15.594,p<.01)forafeelevelof$3.00.Thenexthighestpart-worthcoefficientwasinsupportofrevenuebeingusedtomaintainthequalityofthesite(.373,t¼8.367,p<.01).Thepart-worthcoefficientsforallothervariableswere.20(frequentusersinvolvedindecisionmakingprocess)orless.Theaveragedimpor-tancevaluesforpriceacceptabilityofuserfeeswerequitedifferent.Thevariablewiththehighestaveragedimportancewas‘‘feelevels’’(44.2%).Thevariable‘‘howthefeeisdistributed’’producedanaveragedimportanceof23.0%,whereasaveragedimportancevaluesonothervariableswere12.3%orlower.Theoverallmodeloffiveindependentvariablessignificantlypredictedbothoftheoutcomevariables.TheregressionmodelofthefivevariablesonsocialequityproducedanR2of.70,whereastheregressionmodelofthefivevariablesonpriceacceptabilityshowedR2of.72.Forthetwomodels,othervariablesexceptforpricesubsidyweresignificantatthe.01level.Thismeansthatthefourvariableswerestrongcontributorsinpredictingsocialequityandusefeeacceptability.TheresultsarereportedinTable6.6.ConclusionandimplicationsThepurposeofthisstudywastoidentifydecisionmakingprocessesandoutcomevariablesthatpredictsocialequityjudg-mentsandpriceacceptabilityofuserfeesamongcampers.Anumberofstudieshaveproposedthetheoreticalfoundationsofsocialequityandpriceacceptabilityofuserfees(Crompton&Lamb,1986;Crompton&Lue,1992;McCarvilleetal.,1996).Inthisstudythesetwodependentvariablesweretested.Resultssuggestthatallpredictorswiththeexceptionofpricesubsidyweresignificantatthe.01level.Morespecifically,resultsoftheconjointanalysisrevealedthattheextentofpublicinputwasthemostprominentpredictorofsocialequityjudgmentatthe.01level.Thenexthighestpart-worthcoefficientwasobtainedinsupportoflowuserfees(ahypotheticalscaleof$3.00vs.$8.00),followedbyrevenuebeingallocatedbacktothesite,frequentusersbenefits,seasonpassat$20.00,andareducedpriceforlowincomeusers.Themagnitudeofthepart-worthcoefficientsforpriceaccept-abilityofuserfeesshowedadifferentpattern.Thatis,afeelevelof$3.00wasperceivedasthemostimportantattributeinthePriceacceptabilityp-ValueCoefficientt-Valuep-Value.01.293.22.00.01.404.34.00.65.04.42.67.011.4315.59.00.01.323.04.01.01.758.37.014.02.72predictionofpriceacceptabilityofuserfees.Thenexthighestpart-worthcoefficientwasinsupportofrevenuebeingusedtomaintainthequalityofthesite.Part-worthcoefficientsforallothervariableswere.20orless.Withtheexceptionofpricesubsidy,allofthecorrespondingregressioncoefficientsweresignificantatthe.01level.Thisstudyfoundthat‘‘extensivepublicinput’’wasanimportantpredictorofsocialequity.Thushighersocialequityjudgmentsarelikelytooccurwhenvisitorsjudgeafeeleveltohavebeenestab-lishedbasedonextensivepublicinput(Becker,1992;Gibson,1991;Lind&Tyler,1988;Tyler&Smith,1998).Thepart-worthcoefficientfor‘‘extensivepublicinput’’(.147)wassignificantinpredictingbothpriceacceptabilityofuserfeesandsocialequity.Thisresultimpliesthatthatpublicinputmaycontributetoefficiency,transparency,accountabilityandresponsivenessofdecisionrelatedtouserfees.Publicinputisthoughttobuildanunderstandingofthedecisionmakingprocessoftheauthorities(Eisenberger,Fasolo,&Davis-DaMastro,1990;VanYperen,VandenBerg,&Willering,1999).ThisresultisconsistentwithLauberandKnuth’s(1999)statementthatpublicinputmaybeusedtoholdthegovernmentaccountable,facilitategooddecisions,promotefairness,andpromoteacceptanceofgovernmentdecisions.Second,alargepart-worthcoefficientwasfoundfor‘‘specialpublicmeetingsheldforfrequentusers’’(.362).The‘‘frequentusersfavoured’’variable(specialmeetingforfrequentusersvs.nospecialmeeting)explained19.6%oftheaveragedimportanceinthepredictionofsocialequity.Theseresultsaresimilartothoseofapreviousstudythatconsideredtheextenttowhichfrequentuserswerefavouredindecisionmakingprocesses(Shapiro&Brett,1993).Inthesepreviousstudies,respondentshadhighersocialequityjudgmentson‘‘specialpublicmeetingsheldforfrequentusers’’(i.e.,thosewhovisitregularly),comparedtosituationsinwhich‘‘nospecialmeetings’’wereheldforfrequentusers(Peterson,1992).Underfrequentuserfavoureddecisionmakingprocedures,frequentusersaremorelikelytocomplywithdecisions(Lind&Tyler,1988;Tyler,1984).Thepart-worthcoefficient,‘‘specialpublicmeetingsheldforfrequentusers’’(.201)washigherthanthatof‘‘nospecialmeetingsforfrequentusers’’(À.201)onpriceacceptabilityofuserfees.Resultsofthisstudycorrespondedtothoseofpreviousstudieswhichindicatedthatfrequentusersremainmorecommittedtotheagency’suserfeedecision,aremorelikelytosupporttheorgani-zation,andarelesslikelytodestabilizetheagency’sauthoritywhenpublicagenciesimplementspecialmeetingforinputbyfrequentusers(Burke&Stets,1999;McClaran&King,1999).Theresultsalsosuggestthatfrequentuserswillaccept,support,orcomplywithagency’sfeeleveldecisionsandactionsifspecialmeetingswereheldtoallowforinputbyfrequentuserstovoicetheiropinion.Therelationship,however,between‘‘frequentuserfavouredindeci-sion’’andpriceacceptabilityofuserfeesisweak.The‘‘frequentusersfavouredindecisionprocess’’variablerepresentedonly12.3%210J.Parketal./TourismManagement31(2010)202–212
oftheaveragedimportanceinpredictionofpriceacceptabilityofuserfees.Third,thepart-worthcoefficientof‘‘pricesubsidy’’variablewasnotasignificantpredictorofsocialequityinthisstudy(t¼.445,p<.656).Theresultsdidnotsupportthe‘‘theoryofgenerosity’’wherepersonswithlowincomewhoareinneedofassistancetoenablethemtoparticipateinactivitiesarewillingtopayhigherfeesifexcessprofitsareallocatedtodeservingcharities(Kahnemanetal.,1976;Martins&Monroe,1994).Forexample,usersmayacceptadecreaseinthelossessustainedbystudents,childrenandseniorsasawayofrestoringequity,becausesuchgroupsaregenerallyperceivedaslowincomeusers.The‘‘pricesubsidy’’variableisnotasignificantpredictorofpriceacceptabilityofuserfeesinthisstudy(t¼.422,p<.673).Thesefindingsdifferfromthefindingsofstudiesoflandusepolicyregardingspecialaidforeconomicallyunderprivilegedpeople(Christensen&Dustin,1989).Resultsofthisstudydidnotsupport‘‘generositytheory’’and‘‘prosocialbehaviourtheory’’(Christensen&Dustin,1989;Gra-mann&VanderStoep,1987).Rather,resultsofthecurrentstudyshowthatpeopledonotsupportfreeusebylowincomeusersnordotheybelievethatfeewaiversshouldbeprovidedtoallowaccessforthosewhoareunabletopay.Fourth,alargepart-worthcoefficientwasfoundfor‘‘$3.00pervehicleperday’’(.207)inthepredictionofsocialequity.This‘‘feelevels’’variable($3.00pervehicleperdayvs.$8.00pervehicleperday)wasthesecondhighestaveragedimportancevalue(22.1%)amongthesetofpredictors.Thelargestaveragedimportancewastheextentofpublicinput(26.09%).Theseresultssuggestthatlowerlevelsofuserfees($3.00pervehicleperday),followedbypublicinput,maycreatehighersocialequityjudgments.Resultsofthisstudyfullysupporttheunderclasshypothesis(Lineberry,1977;Mladenka&Hill,1977)orafairpricetheory(Lineberry,1977).Loweruserfeestendtohavealargerimpactonspecificuserswhosedemandsareinelastic.Thisgroupincludesuserswhohavenowhereelsetogo,andwhohavenosatisfactorysubstitutesavailable.Specificusersmaybeforcedtostopusingthefacilities.Inadditiontothequestionsthatwereusedfortheconjointanalysis,respondentswereaskedtorespondtoaquestionaboutuserfees’perception.The‘‘feelevels’’variablewasthemostimportantpredictorofpriceacceptabilityofuserfeesamongtheentiresetofvariables(averagedimportance¼4.2%).Thisresultisofconcernbecausefeelevelsserveasanindicatorofacceptabilityasagivenbudgetconstraint.Asanestimateofmonetaryvaluesfornon-marketedbenefitsinresource-basedrecreation(Scitovsky,1945),priceisofsufficientuniversalimportancetobetheprimarydeterminantofpriceacceptabilityofuserfees.Fifth,the‘‘frequentuserbenefits’’variablehasamoderateinfluenceonthepredictionofsocialequityasindicatedbytheaveragedimportancevalueof11.3%.Resultssupportthepositionthatsocialequityjudgmentsfollowfromcircumstancesinwhichfrequentusersreceivemorebenefitsatlowcost.Resultsshowthatmorefrequentuseisthoughttoentitlevisitorstosometangiblebenefit,suchasapricereductiononaparticularproductorservice.Othersrewardfrequentcustomersfortheirloyalty.Acoffeeshop,forexample,maygiveeachofitscustomersacardthatispunchedwhenapoundofcoffeeispurchased.Whenthecardiscompletelypunched,thecustomergetsafreepound.Itseemsclearthatfrequentusersshouldhavetheopportunitytobenefitmorethanoccasionalusers.Apositivepart-worthcoefficientwasfoundfor‘‘seasonpassat$20.00’’(.161)incomparisonwith‘‘nofrequentuserbenefits’’(À.161)inthe‘‘frequentuserbenefits’’variable.Littleresearchexiststhatincorporatesthe‘‘frequentuserbenefits’’variableintothepriceacceptabilityofuserfees.Pastresearchhasgenerallyfocusedondifferentialfees,forexample,higherfeesarechargedatpopularsitesorduringpeakperiodsandlowerfeesarechargedatothersitesortimes(Manning,Callinan,Echelberger,Koenemann,&McEwen,1984).Similarly,higherorlowerratesmaybechargedatspecifictimesofthedayorweektoflattenpeaksandreducetroughs.However,ifa‘‘daypasspolicy’’thatexcludesafrequentuserbenefitsisset,thelevelofsupportwilldiminishwithacor-respondingdeclineinloyaltytotheagency.Sixth,alargerpart-worthcoefficientwasfoundfor‘‘staysatsitetomaintainqualityservice’’(.364)incomparisonwith‘‘goestoU.S.Treasurytobenefitthecountryasawhole’’(À.364)inthe‘‘howisrevenuedistributed’’variable.Theseresultsarealsoconsistentwiththedistributivejusticeliterature(Fedler&Miles,1989;Folger,1977;Greenberg,1986;Lind,Kanfer,&Earley,1990;Sweeney&McFarlin,1993).Forexample,astudyofFedlerandMiles(1989)reportedthatvisitorswereopposedtoreturningfeestotheU.S.Treasurybecausetheybelievedthatthisdistributionofuserfeeswouldnotincreasetheirvisitors’socialequityjudgmentsandthatvisitorsexpectedadecreaseinqualityduetotheirfeesleavingtheirsite.Therefore,accordingtotheresultsofthisstudy,thepreferredfeedistributionmethodisforthefeerevenuemoneytoremainonsiteandbeusedtoimprovevisitorfacilitiesandservicesandforresourceprotec-tion.Theseresultsmaybeaneffectivetoolforpolicymakersandpractitionerstousetocreatefairandreasonablefees.Byidentifyingvariablesthatcontributetosocialequityjudgmentsandpriceacceptabilityofuserfees,managerscancultivatetrustindecisionmakingorganizationsandincreaseusers’commitmenttonaturalresources.Resultsofthisstudycanhelpmanagersdesignandimplementrationaluserfeestobetterachievemanagementobjectivesthatbuilduptrustandgoodwillovertime.Specifically,itidentifiesaseriesofuserfeesettingattributes,thatofferagenciesdirectguidelinesonhowtoframeasociallyresponsibleuserfeeprogramtotheiruser,includingrecommendationonhowtocollectuserfees,setprices,andhowtospendrevenuecollected.Somelimitationsorsuggestionsforfurtherstudieswerealsoidentified.Inthisstudy,variablessuchasage,incomelevelandattitudestowardnaturalresourceswereexcludedforseveralreasons.First,thisstudywasnotdesignedtosegmenttheaccep-tancelevelofadmissionpriceaccordingtosocio-demographicvariables.Rather,thepurposewastoidentifyacceptanceofadmissionpricewhichcanbepredictedbyvariablesbasedonproceduraljusticefactorsanddistributivejusticefactors.Second,conjointanalysisdoesnotallowtheinclusionofthelargenumberofvariablesthatwouldberequired.Furtherresearchisneededtotestasegmentationmodeltoseeifdifferentagegroups,usertypes,orpoliticalaffiliationshaddifferentpart-worthcoefficients.Thisformofresearchmaybeofvaluetoresearcherswishingtoidentifytheimpactoffeesbasedonvariousgroupswithinsociety.Thisstudyisbasedonaspecificsiteofwesternnationalforestatoneseasonintime.Consequently,cautionwouldbeemployedinmakinganygeneralizationsfromawesternnationalforesttootherForestServicesystemssuchasthosefoundinNewZealand,theUKandelsewhere.Nationalforeststypicallycontainspecialplacesandfeatures,someofwhichareirreplaceable.Foranexampleofhowpriceacceptabilityofuserfeesmightvary,itisusefultoconsiderthecaseofparksthatcontainparticularlyattractivegeographicalfeatures.Inthesecases,YellowstoneNationalParkbeingoneexample,feeshigherthanthatrequiredtomaintaintheparkmaybechargedandsurplusfundssenttootherareas.Tolerationofthevisitortoafeeregimeofthisnaturedependsontheaverageincomeofresidentsinthetargetgeographicalareas.Thecollectiveeconomicconditionofthelocalcommunityandtheamountofdisposableincomeforentertainmentaffectthesensitivityorelas-ticityofamarkettoanincreaseinuserfeeprice.OtherfactorsinfluencingthepriceacceptabilityofuserfeesandsocialequitymayincludepricesforcompetingformsofJ.Parketal./TourismManagement31(2010)202–212211
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